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Abstract
Eyewitness misidentifications are a leading cause of wrongful convictions in the United States
justice system. In the present research, two experiments were designed to determine how lineup
procedures impact identification rates. In Experiment 1, participants were either given a warning
about the adverse consequences of a misidentification, or no warning at all, and were subsequently
presented with either a culprit-absent or culprit-present lineup. While people were more likely to
reject the lineup when the culprit was absent, and more likely to make a suspect identification
when the culprit was present, there was no impact of consequence information on identification
rates. Experiment 2 examined the impact of unbiased instructions, which inform mock
eyewitnesses that the perpetrator could be or could potentially not be in the lineup, and the
inclusion or exclusion of an explicit “not there” option at the time of lineup on choosing rates in
target absent lineups. The “not there” option was more effective at reducing false identifications
than unbiased instructions. These experiments can help researchers and lineup administrators
understand the impact procedures have on identification rates, as well as potentially direct the
development of recommendations for these procedures.
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The Influence of Lineup Procedures on Eyewitness Decision Making
In 1989, Willie Jackson was wrongfully convicted of a rape that had occurred outside of a
bar three years prior, in late spring of 1986 (Innocence Project, 2015; University of Leicester,
2015). Despite living over 150 miles from the scene of the crime, Mr. Jackson’s photo was
placed in a photographic lineup and subsequently identified. The victim also later identified him
in a live lineup. Mr. Jackson spent 17 years in prison before a DNA analysis of semen found on
the victim’s pantyhose conclusively ruled him out as the perpetrator.
Unfortunately, there are many cases like Mr. Jackson’s. Nearly 72% of the 337 people
exonerated on the basis of DNA evidence were wrongfully convicted as a result of eyewitness
misidentifications (Innocence Project, 2016). Because of the extreme rarity of DNA samples, and
the lack of resources necessary to examine every case of wrongful conviction, this number
represents only a portion of those who have been wrongfully incarcerated as a result of
inaccurate eyewitness testimony (Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006). Since DNA evidence only
retroactively frees those who have been wrongfully convicted, it is necessary to investigate ways
to help prevent further incarceration of innocent people. Psychological research on eyewitness
identifications has attempted to achieve this goal by uncovering several highly suggestive
components of the eyewitness identification procedure which account for at least some
misidentifications (e.g., Charman & Wells, 2006; Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001;
Wells, Rydell, & Seelau, 1993).
To exacerbate this problem, juror reliance on eyewitness testimony is strong and
problematic. When asked to estimate the hit rate, or the rate at which an accurate culprit
identification is made, based on stimulus materials from eyewitness identification studies, mock
jurors assumed a hit rate far greater than the actual hit rate (an assumed hit rate 70.6% compared
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to the actual hit rate of 12.5%, for one scenario; Brigham & Bothwell, 1983). Across three
scenarios, 90% of participants assumed the hit rate to be greater than it actually was. Similarly,
people were far more likely to judge an eyewitness as being accurate than inaccurate (Lindsay,
Wells, & Rumpel, 1981). This result is problematic because there is no correlation between
jurors’ assessments of accuracy and actual accuracy (Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979). In light
of this overestimation of accuracy, the fact that jurors are more likely to convict a suspect if there
is an eyewitness identification that supports the suspect’s culpability, and data demonstrating that
decisions on cases that include eyewitness testimony are less accurate than those without, it is
crucial for psychological research to determine ways to protect eyewitnesses from making false
identifications (Loftus, 1975, as cited in Brigham & Bothwell, 1983; Seltzer, Lopes, & Venuti,
1990). The current experiments aim to understand various environmental factors during an
identification procedure that influence identification decisions.
To enhance the ability of psychology research to assist the justice system, Wells (1978)
differentiated between estimator variables and system variables. Estimator variables are
variables that impact eyewitness identification, but are outside of the control of the justice
system, such as the seriousness of the crime or the presence of a weapon. By contrast, system
variables are variables that can be controlled by the justice system. Data on how estimator
variables influence identification accuracy allow legal practitioners to form opinions about the
potential accuracy, or inaccuracy, of identifications. For example, a defense attorney could
contest the veracity of a cross-race identification, citing research which suggests that
identifications made across race yield a higher rate of false identifications, and also a lower rate
of correct identifications (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). To complement estimator variable
research, data on how various system variables influence choosing behavior inform researchers’
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recommendations for best eyewitness identification practices. When the justice system
manipulates these variables, it can have a powerful impact on both correct identification and
incorrect identification rates. For instance, the justice system can improve eyewitness accuracy
by conducting the lineup as soon after the crime as possible, as a longer retention interval
decreases memory for the event (Lipton, 1997). Because of the significant problem eyewitness
misidentifications pose to preserving the freedom of the innocent, an extensive body of literature
has examined ways to improve procedures in order to ameliorate this issue. The following
sections will outline current research on several system variables relevant to the present studies.
Lineup Construction
The appearance of lineup fillers, also known as distractors, is a crucial consideration
when attempting to generate a non-suggestive lineup (Flowe, Klatt, & Colloff, 2014; Wells,
Rydell, & Seelau, 1993). In order to assess how a filler’s appearance in relation to the suspect
would influence false and correct identifications, Wells et al. (1993) compared identification
accuracy with a 3 (filler appearance: resemble suspect vs. mismatch suspect vs. match
description) x 2 (culprit presence: present vs. absent) independent groups experimental design.
Participants were shown a staged theft, and then asked to give a description of the culprit.
Lineups were individually constructed for each participant based on the description they gave. In
the resemble suspect condition, lineups had either the culprit or an innocent suspect, plus five
lineup fillers who resembled the culprit or innocent suspect. In other words, fillers matched the
physical appearance of either the guilty or innocent suspect on factors beyond what the
eyewitness described, such as eyebrow thickness (as long as that feature was not described by the
witness). The goal of this condition was to generate a lineup in which all the fillers looked as
much like the suspect as possible. Lineup fillers in the match description condition matched the
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description of the culprit, but did not match on features that were not mentioned in the
description given by the eyewitness. In the mismatch suspect condition, the suspect (innocent or
guilty) matched the description given by the eyewitness, but the lineup fillers did not match the
description. Diagnosticity, or the ratio of correct identifications to false identifications, was
greatest in the match description condition. This difference is attributable to a lower rate of false
identifications when the lineup fillers matched the description of the culprit given by the
eyewitness, but did not match on factors beyond those mentioned.
In addition to the physical appearance of fillers impacting decision making, the emotional
appearance of fillers influences the suggestiveness of a lineup. In the first of two studies, Flowe
et al. (2014) used a 3 (suspect emotional expression: angry vs. happy vs. neutral) x 2 (filler type:
match emotion vs. unmatched emotion) x 2 (suspect gender: male vs. female) design to assess
the impact that suspect and filler emotional expression had on eyewitness choosing behavior.
Participants were not exposed to culprit faces before the lineup, as the goal of this experiment
was to determine which conditions would allow people to guess which lineup member was the
suspect at a rate greater than chance. When the suspect displayed an angry face, which is often
assessed as being stereotypically criminal, participants were able to identify which lineup
member was the suspect at a rate that was significantly greater than chance, but only when the
fillers did not match the emotional expression of the suspect (e.g., had neutral faces). When the
lineup fillers’ emotional expression did match that of the suspect, participants were significantly
less able to identify which lineup member was the suspect than when the fillers did not match the
suspects’ angry expression. Therefore, not matching the fillers’ emotional expressions to that of
an angry suspect made the lineup suggestive because the suspect could be picked out at a rate
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greater than chance. This suggestiveness in turn influenced whom an eyewitness identified as the
suspect.
As intuitive as those results may seem (because it would be expected an angry face would
be interpreted as more criminal than non-angry faces, and thus identified as the suspect), the
pattern of results laid a foundation for Flowe et al.’s (2014) next study. This second study
presented participants with a series of faces to study (not in crime scenarios) before showing
them the lineup, which allowed researchers to assess how the suggestibility of mismatched
emotional expression (and the resulting suggestive lineup) impacted decision making and
identification rates when faces previously been seen. When a suspect was angry, putting them in
a lineup with fillers that matched their emotional expression led to significantly more accurate
identifications and significantly fewer inaccurate identifications than when they were in a lineup
where fillers were not also angry. In other words, matching the fillers’ emotional expression to
the suspects’ changed identification rates, but only when the suspect was expressing high levels
of anger. Based on the results of this study, it is reasonable for researchers to recommend that
investigators should construct lineups in which the fillers match the emotional expression of the
suspect, because this promotes identification decisions that result in lower levels of
misidentifications and greater rates of correct identifications as compared to when emotional
expression is not matched.
Lineup Presentation: Sequential vs. Simultaneous
The way in which eyewitnesses are presented with a lineup has significant bearing on
identification accuracy (Lindsay & Wells, 1985; Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001;
Wells, Steblay, & Dysart, 2012). Traditionally, lineup members were (and still often are)
presented to witnesses all at one time. This simultaneous presentation directs the eyewitness’s

EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES

10

decision towards being a relative choice as opposed to an absolute choice. In other words,
witnesses choose which lineup member looks most like the suspect rather than determining if
each lineup member is or is not the suspect. The tacit suggestion that an eyewitness should pick
which lineup member most resembles the suspect has negative implications if the suspect is not
in the lineup because the identification of the person who looks most like the culprit out of all the
lineup members is still a false identification. In order to avoid this possibility, many researchers
recommend that lineups should be presented sequentially, where each lineup member is shown to
the eyewitnesses one at a time, rather than simultaneously in order to avoid the use of relative
judgment. Lindsay and Wells (1985) employed a 2 (lineup presentation: simultaneous vs.
sequential) x 2 (culprit presence: absent vs. present) independent groups experimental design in
order to assess the impact sequential lineup presentation has on the diagnosticity of an
identification. There was a significant interaction between lineup presentation and culprit
presence where lineup presentation had no impact on accuracy when the culprit was present, but
sequential presentation produced significantly fewer false identifications than simultaneous
presentations when the culprit was absent. Therefore, the the ratio of correct to incorrect
identifications was greater when participants were presented with a sequential lineup than when
presented with a simultaneous lineup. This experiment demonstrates that different procedures
have different impacts on identification decisions.
Steblay et al. (2011) utilized meta-analytic techniques to assess the sequential-superiority
effect first documented by Lindsay and Wells (1985). Across several studies, participants made
significantly more correct decisions when the lineup members were presented sequentially than
when they were presented simultaneously. Fewer than half (49%) of participants provided with
culprit absent simultaneous lineups correctly rejected the lineup, compared to the 72% of
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participants who correctly rejected the lineup when it was presented sequentially. Incorrect
identifications of the suspect in culprit absent lineups were also significantly higher for
simultaneous lineups than sequential lineups. A decrease in false identifications when using the
sequential procedure in culprit absent lineups was accompanied by a decrease in correct
identifications in culprit present lineups, however the latter decrease was smaller (15% decrease
as opposed to 23%). A second meta-analysis conducted after suspicions about the actual impact
of sequential lineup presentation on eyewitness identifications demonstrated the same effect,
though the reduction in correct identifications was even smaller than it had been in the first metaanalysis (Clark, 2005). Since, compared to simultaneous lineup presentation, sequential
procedures decrease false identifications more than correct identifications, conducting sequential
lineups is a superior technique because the diagnosticity is higher when sequential lineups versus
simultaneous lineups are used.
Two potential explanations could account for the impact sequential presentation has on
eyewitness decision making. The first is that it increases discriminability, which means that
eyewitnesses are better able to differentiate between the culprit (if present) and the lineup fillers.
The other possible explanation is that sequential presentation leads eyewitnesses to place their
decision criterion higher (i.e., make it more conservative). The witness’s decision criterion is the
amount of similarity required between the lineup member and the witness’s memory of the
culprit in order to make an identification. Therefore, if the decision criterion is more
conservative, more similarity is required in order for the eyewitness to choose any person. In
order to determine which underlying meta-cognitive process accounted for the results of
presentation studies, Palmer and Brewer (2012) calculated d’, a measure of discriminability, and
c, a measure of criterion placement, for sequential and simultaneous procedures using the data
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from 22 previously conducted studies. Notably, d’ was not significantly different between
simultaneous and sequential procedures, suggesting that discriminability did not change between
the two procedures. On the other hand, c had a small, significant, positive effect size, meaning
that more conservative criterion placement occurred in the sequential procedures than in the
simultaneous procedures: An increase in decision criterion placement in sequential conditions
led participants to require more of a match between the lineup member and the culprit in order to
make an identification. This shift in decision criterion placement likewise explains why
presentation has a more substantial impact in culprit absent than culprit absent lineups: when the
culprit is present, the similarity between the memory of the culprit and the culprit at the time of
the identification is still high enough to exceed the stricter decision criterion. However, when the
culprit is absent, the innocent suspect is less likely to exceed the more conservative criterion
thereby decreasing incorrect identifications. The placement of decision criterion is commonly
cited as a mechanism by which different identification scenarios impact identification decisions.
Instructions
In addition to lineup construction and presentation influences on decision criterion, and
subsequently decision making, other justice system variables relevant to choosing demonstrate
effects on lineup decisions as well. One of these variables is instructions. Two relevant bodies of
eyewitness identification research have examined the impact of instructions on identification
errors.
Charman and Wells (2006) sought to empirically assess the impact of appearance change
instructions on identification accuracy. In a 2 x 2 mixed model experimental design, participants
were either given instructions that the culprit may have undergone appearance changes and
therefore might look different from the way they did at the time of the crime, or were given no
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instructions regarding appearance. When provided with appearance change instructions,
participants were significantly more likely to make an incorrect identification, but only in culprit
absent lineups. By contrast, appearance change instructions had no impact on correct
identifications. Furthermore, diagnosticity was lower with appearance change instructions than
without, though this difference was not statistically significant (p = .15). Consequently, the
authors cautioned against the use of appearance-change instructions in criminal investigations
because of the increase in false identifications, which was unaccompanied by any increase in
correct identifications.
The authors generated two possible explanations for their findings, although their data
could not distinguish between them. The first was that appearance change instructions lowered
decision criteria (Charman & Wells, 2006). An innocent person was more likely to pass the
threshold of similarity required for an identification when provided with appearance-change
instructions because it made decision criteria more lenient. The second explanation offered for
these results was that there was a general increase in the amount of actual ecphoric similarity
after receiving the instructions (Charman & Wells, 2006). Ecphoric similarity is defined as the
degree of similarity between the eyewitness’s memory for the culprit and the appearance of a
lineup member. This notion suggests appearance change instructions made participants
experience a greater sense of recognition for a lineup member’s face because certain features
such as hair no longer needed to match because of their potential to change.
Lineup instructions informing the participants about the potential that the suspect may or
may not be in the lineup likewise have a substantial impact on decision criterion placement, and
thus identification decisions. Research on this topic assumes that lineup procedures that do not
warn the eyewitness that the perpetrator might not be present in the lineup suggest that the culprit
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is in the lineup, and therefore a choice should be made (Clark, 2005; Malpass & Devine, 1981;
Steblay, 1997). Such biased instructions are thus suggestive because they lower eyewitnesses’
decision criteria (Clark, 2005). This biased suggestion is inherent in the omission of a warning
about the potential absence of the offender. Research on this topic, therefore, has aimed to
decrease the suggestiveness of the eyewitness procedure by providing mock-eyewitnesses with
unbiased instructions, which are designed to make the decision criterion stricter by addressing
the assumption that the task of an eyewitness is to pick an individual from the lineup. Unbiased
instructions inform participants that a perpetrator may or may not be present in the lineup, thus
alerting eyewitnesses to the potential that the lineup is composed entirely of innocent people.
Results from Malpass and Devine’s (1981) mock vandalism study, a 2 (instructions:
biased vs. unbiased) x 2 (presence of vandal: present vs. absent) independent groups design,
support the notion of the suggestibility of biased lineup instructions: unbiased instructions
significantly decreased the number of false identifications, a pattern that was marked by more
conservative decision criterion placement. Notably, unbiased instructions and the associated
stricter criterion did not significantly decrease the number of correct identifications, perhaps
because participants in this condition experienced high ecphoric similarity. This higher ratio of
correct identifications to false identifications demonstrates that unbiased instructions improved
the diagnosticity of lineup identifications.
Steblay’s (1997) meta-analysis of 18 studies about the impact of biased instructions on
eyewitness choosing behavior yielded a similar pattern of results to those found in Malpass and
Devine (1981). The impact of biased instructions on choosing behavior was evidenced by the
increase in false identifications but negligible change in correct identifications (Steblay, 1997). It
appears that giving eyewitnesses unbiased instructions serves only to help preserve the freedom
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of innocent suspects, not guilty ones. Additionally, analysis of confidence demonstrated that
participants were less certain when given biased instructions, especially when the culprit was
absent; perhaps the leniency of the decision criterion encourages choices about which
participants might feel uneasy.
The implementation of unbiased instructions does not make eyewitnesses immune to
other suggestive influences prior to the identification procedure. For example, information about
the ease of the identification task given by the experimenter can cause decision criterion
placement to become less stringent than they were immediately after unbiased instructions had
been given (Quinlivan et al., 2010). The experimenter either told participants, “I could really tell
you were paying a lot of attention; surely you are going to be able to pick the person out from the
lineup” or gave them no such suggestion, and then gave either biased or unbiased instructions
(Quinlivan et al., 2010, p. 170). Pre-admonition instructions had no impact on the rate of false
identifications in the biased condition. However, pre-admonition instructions generated
significantly higher false identification rates when unbiased instructions were given. In fact,
decision criteria had been lowered to the point where participants who received the preadmonition suggestion and unbiased instructions were making the same number of false
identifications as those who received biased instructions, meaning that pre-admonition
completely undid the protective impact of unbiased instructions.
Apparently, there are many factors that influence eyewitness accuracy. It is particularly
important to focus research on system variable changes in order to understand what the most
effective lineup procedures are, and subsequently make procedural recommendations to
practitioners, as the aforementioned studies have done. The current studies aim to test the impact
of other various external influences, in the form of eyewitness identification procedures, on
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identification accuracy: Study 1 tests the differential impact of providing mock eyewitness with
information about the consequences of a misidentification on identification accuracy with both
culprit absent and culprit present lineups. Study 2 determines how unbiased instructions and a
“not there” option interact to influence false identifications in culprit absent lineups.
Study 1
One way in which the eyewitness identification literature has assessed the success of
system variable manipulations is by comparing the number of correct identifications (hits) to the
number of incorrect identifications (false alarms)1. As noted earlier, the ratio of hits to false
alarms, known as diagnosticity, is designed to represent probative value, the likelihood that an
identification is indicative of guilt (Wells & Lindsay, 1980). A greater ratio of hits to false
alarms means a higher probative value, and, consequently, a greater likelihood that an
identification can be considered accurate and thus indicative of guilt. Because diagnosticity
incorporates both the rate of hits and the rate of false alarms, it can be increased by either
increasing the number of hits, decreasing the number of false alarms, or both. Because
eyewitness identification researchers have adopted the moral standpoint of the Blackstone Ratio,
which suggests that it is morally superior to let a guilty person go free than to convict an
innocent person (Blackstone, 1765), research in this field has primarily focused on decreasing
the number of false alarms. The primary avenue through which this objective has been achieved
is in researching system variables that decrease the suggestibility, or the likelihood that a suspect
is chosen for a reason besides recognition, of the eyewitness identification procedure.

1

Incorrect identifications refer to identifications of an innocent suspect from lineups in which the
culprit is not present, unless otherwise specified.
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The results of the Quinlivan et al. (2010) study support the cue belief model, which posits
that external information serves as a cue for witnesses during their decision making process and
when generating their beliefs about other testimony related judgments, such as confidence.
Leippe, Eisenstadt, Rauch, and Stambush (2006) first proposed the model in an experiment
which showed that participants rated their memory as being significantly better if they received
positive feedback about their memory than if they had received negative or no feedback. This
demonstrates that external cues can be used as a source of information during eyewitness
identification procedures.
The effects of these external cues are not always the same. For example, participants
given confirming post identification feedback rated their confidence as being significantly higher
than those who did not receive confirming feedback, though feedback impacted inaccurate
witnesses significantly more than it impacted accurate witnesses (Bradfield, Wells, & Olson,
2002). The selective cue integration framework (SCIF) explains this asymmetrical impact of
external information by suggesting a three step process that occurs when witnesses assess the
identification experience (Charman et al., 2010, Steblay, Wells, & Douglass, 2014). First,
witnesses turn to internal cues to develop their judgments. Next, if internal cues are deemed
inadequate sources of information, then witnesses use external cues. Bradfield et al. (2002)
consider the experience of ecphoric similarity to constitute a strong internal cue, explaining why
external information was not as influential when witnesses made an accurate identification. The
last step of the SCIF is the assessment of credibility; if the source is assessed to be credible then
it impacts the witnesses’ judgments. This explains why information coming from an investigator,
typically a credible source, would influence witness judgments. Overall, the theory sufficiently
explains why external influences are less likely to impact those who are presented with and
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accurately identify a previously seen stimulus. While the cue belief model and the SCIF are
theories used to explain the impact of external information on confidence and other testimony
relevant judgments, the current research attempts to apply these theoretical models to
identification decisions as well.
One external influence that has not been studied is general information about eyewitness
performance. For example, it is conceivable that a potential eyewitness could be presented with
information about the consequences of eyewitness identification errors. For example, how would
knowledge of the costliness of a misidentification impact decision making when the culprit is
absent or present? If the cue belief model serves as a theoretical explanation for decision making
as well as confidence, external information about the consequences of a misidentification might
serve as an external cue that influences decision criterion placement. Since the manipulation
aims to undo the inherent suggestiveness of the eyewitness identification procedure, it is
expected that participants who receive this information will place their decision criterion more
conservatively because they will be more conscious of the negative outcomes that could result
from making a false identification. However, according to the selective cue integration
framework, the impact of this external influence will only occur if internal cues are not strong
(Charman et al., 2010). Therefore, participants presented with culprit present lineups will be less
influenced by external information because the ecphoric experience when they see the culprit
will serve as a strong internal cue (Bradfield et al., 2002).
Just as how other variables, such as instructions and post-identification feedback
influence eyewitnesses given culprit-present and culprit-absent lineups differently, it is expected
that the consequence information provided before the identification will decrease false
identifications but have less of an impact on correct identifications (or perhaps no impact at all).
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In other words, I expect information about the potential consequences of eyewitness
identifications to improve the probative value of an identification by decreasing false
identifications more than correct identifications.
Study 1 is designed to undo the suggestiveness of the eyewitness identification
procedure. One way to undo this suggestiveness would be to foster more conservative decision
criteria. This study will attempt to determine if informing mock eyewitnesses that, if they make
an identification, an innocent person may go to jail and a guilty person will go free decreases
suggestiveness, thereby increasing diagnosticity. This warning is predicted to make decision
criteria more conservative in two ways. First, because it implies to witnesses that they may be
wrong, witnesses will be more careful in their decision making in order to avoid being wrong.
Secondly, knowing that a wrong decision can result in both an innocent person being wrongfully
convicted and a guilty person remaining at large will cause mock witnesses to require more of a
match between a lineup member and their memory of the culprit in order to avoid these known
adverse consequences. If the data support the hypothesis, these studies will begin a new area of
system variable research that aims to understand and find ways to decrease the suggestibility of
eyewitness identification procedures in order to increase how diagnostic an identification is of
guilt.
Method
Participants. Participants (N = 121) were recruited from the undergraduate introductory
psychology and neuroscience courses, and from the larger student body at Bates College (77
females, 43 males, and 1 who declined to report). Students received either partial course credit or
$5 for their participation. The mean age of the sample was 18.66 years (SD = 0.87). Ninety-two
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participants identified as White/European American, 8 self identified as Black/African
American, 8 as Asian/Asian American, and 12 as other.
Materials and procedure. Participants were shown a mock crime video depicting a man
placing a bomb in the ventilation system on the roof of a building (as used in Bradfield et al.,
2002). A snapshot of this video can be seen in Appendix A. The researcher instructed
participants that, “the purpose of this experiment is for you, as the eyewitness, to identify the
man you saw in the video.” Participants were given no warning that the perpetrator may or may
not be in the lineup. Biased instructions were given to avoid having all participants in the target
absent condition making a correct rejection. In the consequence awareness condition, they were
told, “if you identify an innocent person, they might be wrongfully convicted and a guilty person
will go free.” Participants in the control condition received no information about the
consequences of a misidentification.
The researcher then administered a simultaneous photographic lineup on the computer. In
the culprit present condition, the picture of the actual perpetrator was in the lineup, as well as
five filler photographs. In the culprit absent condition, participants were presented with a lineup
containing six innocent people. Both lineups can be found in Appendix B. Participants were also
given an explicit “not there” option in order to avoid 100% identification rates in all conditions.
After completing the identification task, participants were asked to complete evaluations of their
confidence in their decision, testimony relevant judgments, such as the ease of the identification.
The survey evaluating these dependent variables is in Appendix C. All participants were fully
debriefed on the purpose of the experiment, compensated, and then dismissed.

EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES

21

Results
Contrary to predictions, Multiple chi-square analyses revealed that there was no
relationship between warning and identification decision: There was no effect of warning when
the culprit was absent from the lineup, χ2(2) = 1.40, p = .50. Identification decisions were also no
different based on warning when the culprit was present in the lineup, χ2(2) = 1.94, p = .38.
When the culprit was absent, there was no difference in the percent of designated suspect
identifications in the warning condition (16.1%) when compared to the no warning condition
(6.9%). For the innocent foil identifications, there was no difference in ID rates between the
warning (22.6%) and no warning (20.7%) conditions. Lastly, warning had no significant impact
on the rate of lineup rejections: 61.3% of participants given a warning about the consequences of
misidentification rejected the lineup compared to the 72.4% of people who rejected the lineup
without the warning. See Figure 1 for a graphical representation of these results.
A chi-square analysis of the relationship between warning and identification also found
no impact of warning on identification type when the culprit was present. There was no
difference in suspect identifications in the warning condition (54.8%) when compared to the no
warning condition (70%), no difference in innocent filler identifications between the two groups
(16.1% vs. 6.7%), and no difference in the rate of lineup rejections (29.0% vs. 23.3%), as
indicated in Figure 2. There was, however, a significant difference in identification rates when
the culprit was absent compared to when the culprit was present, χ2(2) = 34.52, p < .001: suspect
identifications were significantly greater when the culprit was present (63.3%) than when he was
absent (11.7%). The pattern was reversed for lineup rejections, where more people rejected the
lineup when the culprit was absent (66.7%) than when the culprit was present (25%). There was
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no significant difference in innocent lineup member identifications between the culprit present
(11.7%) and culprit absent (21.7%) conditions.

Culprit Absent
Percent of Identifications
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Figure 1. The effect of warning on identification type for culprit absent lineups
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Figure 2. The effect of warning on identification type for culprit present lineups
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Multiple univariate ANOVAS were conducted to determine the impact of culprit
presence and consequence warning on various testimony relevant judgments, such as certainty,
view of the culprit, number of seconds the culprit was in view, how easy it was to make out
specific features of the culprit, the distance of the viewer from the culprit, ease and length of
identification, and how much the eyewitness would trust the testimony of another eyewitness
who had seen the same video. There were no significant interaction between culprit presence and
consequence warning on any of these variables [all Fs(1,120) < 1.194, all ps > .277], with one
exception noted in the paragraph below.
Although we had no basis for predictions, several two-way ANOVAs examined the
influences of warning as a function of culprit presence. These revealed a significant main effect
of culprit presence on the ease of identification [F(1, 117) = 5.54, p = .02], as well as a
marginally significant effect of warning on ease of identification [F(1,117) = 3.06, p = .08].
Participants in the culprit absent condition rated their identification as more difficult (M = 6.53,
SD = 1.98) than those in the culprit present condition (M = 5.66, SD = 2.17). Participants who
did not receive a warning rated their decision as marginally more difficult (M = 6.42, SD = 1.91)
than those who did receive the consequence warning (M = 5.77, SD = 2.26). There was also a
marginally significant main effect of warning type [F(1, 116) = 3.59, p = .06] and a significant
interaction between warning and culprit presence on the number of seconds people estimated the
culprit’s face was in view, F(1,116) = 4.51, p = .04. Warning had no impact when the culprit was
present, t(58) = 0.17, p = .86. However, when the culprit was absent, participants who received
the warning rated the culprit’s face as being in view longer (M = 6.77s, SD = 5.06) than those
who did not receive the warning, M = 4.14s, SD = 1.60; t(36) = 2.76, p = .01.2 All other main
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effects of and interactions between culprit presence and warning on the testimony relevant
judgments were non significant (All Fs < 3.06, all ps > .08).
Discussion
These data did not support the hypothesis that a warning about the consequence of a
misidentification would decrease the rate of false identifications without impacting correct
identifications. In fact, the consequence warning had no impact on identification rates. However,
culprit presence had a significant impact on identification decision: more participants in the
target present condition made a suspect identification than those in the target absent condition,
and more mock-eyewitnesses rejected the lineup when the target was absent than when he was
present.
Within the context of the selective cue integration framework, the Study 1 data might
suggest that internal cues were strong. Another possibility is that consequence information was
an insufficient external cue, and therefore had no effect on identifications. A third explanation is
that perhaps the warning came from an unreliable source, as the experimenter was young,
female, and an undergraduate student. Since previous studies have established that internal cues,
such as ecphoric similarity, are weak for eyewitnesses given culprit absent lineups (see: Charman
et al., 2010), the latter two explanations are more likely. A study with an experimenter of a
different age and not a peer of the participants is necessary to determine which explanation better
explains these data. It is also possible that the SCIF does not apply to decision making, but only
to testimony relevant judgments.
Another possible explanation for these data is that knowledge of the consequence of a
misidentification was not actively salient at the time of the identification. The idea that
instructions are not necessarily at the forefront of eyewitnesses’ minds during their identification
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is evidenced by an experiment that determined that, when participants were given unbiased
instructions, 32% of young (18-32 years old) people and 54% of old (55-85 years old) people
forgot them (Rose, Bull, & Vrij, 2005). This is problematic because participants who forgot the
instructions performed significantly worse at the identification task than those who did not
forget, as they were less accurate in their identification decisions. It would therefore be useful to
discern what procedures aid eyewitnesses in remembering that the person may not be in the
lineup. One avenue through which this may perhaps be achieved is the presence of a “not there”
option on the identification sheet. In addition to being presented with boxes that correspond to
the numbers of the lineup members, there would be an additional box reading “He’s not there.”
This way, the knowledge that there is a chance the culprit might not be in the lineup is present in
working memory at the time of identification.
Study 2
The efficacy of unbiased instructions has resulted in eyewitness identification researchers
recommending that the justice system standardize the administration of unbiased instructions. To
recap, research demonstrates that when unbiased instructions are used, false identification rates
decrease in culprit absent lineups, but correct identifications remain unaffected (e.g., Steblay,
1997). However, many of the studies in Steblay’s (1997) meta-analysis on the effects of
unbiased instructions on identification accuracy, including Malpass and Devine’s (1981) original
experiment on the topic, confounded unbiased instructions with an explicit “not there” option. In
other words, when mock-eyewitness received instructions telling them that the perpetrator may
or may not be in the lineup, they were also given a “not there” option, whereas participants given
biased instructions received no such option. A consequence of this confounding is that it is
unclear what impact unbiased instructions and the “not there” option have on identifications.
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Indeed, it is possible that effects previously attributed to unbiased instructions may actually have
been a product of the presence of the “not there” option.
Not only does having a “not there” option have the potential to make the idea that the
culprit might not be present in the lineup more salient at the time of identification, but perhaps it
can play the same role in decreasing false identifications as instructions do (or even explain
previous effects thought to be due to instructions). The results of Study 1 potentially suggest that
just the “not there” option is effective in producing low rates of false identifications, even
without unbiased instructions. As such, a “not there” option could possibly achieve the same
purposes as unbiased instructions: it could make decision criterion stricter by indicating that the
culprit is not necessarily in the lineup. Furthermore, it could achieve this at the time the
identification is made, rather than before, making the option to not make an identification more
salient at the time when it is most important. Therefore, Study 2 will determine how a “not there”
option impacts false identifications in culprit absent lineups, both when instructions are biased
and when instructions are unbiased.
Method
Participants. Participants (N = 307) consisted of MTurk (an online survey site) users
(121 female, 185 male) each of whom was compensated $0.50 for completing the 10-minute
online survey. The age range of participants was 20-81 years old (M = 35.57, SD = 11.54). Of the
participants in this sample, 242 identified as White/European American, 22 as Black/African
American, and 34 as Asian/Asian American.
Materials and procedure. Participants were provided with videotaped instructions of a
lineup administrator3 letting them know they would be watching a short video, and to pay
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Special thank you to Professor Todd Kahan for acting as the lineup administrator
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attention to the man in the video because they would be asked questions about him later. Next,
participants were shown the same mock crime video used in Study 1, and lastly watched a video
of the same lineup administrator in the preliminary instructions video informing them that their
task was to identify the man whom they saw in the video. Half of participants received unbiased
instructions in this third video, telling them, “the perpetrator who placed the bomb in the
ventilation system may be one of the members of the lineup. There is also the potential that the
perpetrator is not in the lineup.” The other half of participants received biased instructions, with
no information about the potential that the culprit might not be present in the lineup. A snapshot
of the video of the lineup administrator is in Appendix D, and scripts of the general, unbiased,
and biased instructions can be found in Appendix E. The survey was set up so that participants
were unable to advance to the next page until the length of time of the video had elapsed.
After the instructions were given, participants saw a 3 x 2 culprit absent, photographic
lineup—the same lineup as was used in Study 1 (see Appendix B). Below the lineup, half of
participants were given the option of choosing lineup members 1-6, plus an option to select
“He’s not there.” The other half of participants were only given the option of choosing 1-6, but
were able to reject the lineup by hitting the ‘next’ button without making an identification. Note
that the consent page had emphasized that participants could “skip any question if, for any
reason… none of the answers appl[ied].” This stress was important to indirectly inform all
participants that they did not necessarily have to make an identification if they did not feel
comfortable doing so.
After the lineup, participants were prompted to answer the same testimony relevant
judgment questions and fill out the same demographic information as Study 1. At the end of the
survey, there was a memory check, which asked participants to answer “yes”, “no”, or “I don’t
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remember” to the question: “did the researcher inform you about the potential that the perpetrator
may not be in the lineup?” The measures for the dependent variables in Study 2 are located in
Appendix F. At the completion of the survey, participants were shown a debrief page and given
their compensation.
Results
Cross-tabulations revealed an uneven distribution of participants in each of the four cells,
perhaps due to participants being assigned unevenly to conditions, or due to differential attrition
rates. Those given biased instructions were more likely to also be in the “not there” option
present condition as opposed to the “not there” option absent condition, while those given
unbiased instructions were less likely to receive a “not there” option and more likely to receive a
lineup without that choice. To compensate for this confounding of the independent variables, 19
participants in the biased instructions and “not there” option present condition and 16
participants in the unbiased instructions and “not there” option absent condition were randomly
excluded from the analysis. The resulting sample had 68 participants in each cell.
A memory check confirmed that most (83.1%) participants who heard unbiased
instructions correctly recalled hearing the researcher inform them about the potential that the
perpetrator may not be in the lineup. 11.0% of people who received these instructions failed to
recall hearing them, and 5.9% reported that they were unsure if they had gotten those
instructions. For participants who did not receive unbiased instructions, 70.6% correctly recalled
not hearing the warning, 9.6% incorrectly reported hearing that the perpetrator might not be in
the lineup, and 19.9% did not remember whether or not they received the unbiased instructions.
These results suggest that participants remembered, or at least recognized that they had heard,
the instructions they had been given.
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For participants in both the “not there” option present and the “not there” option absent
conditions, those who identified lineup members 1-6 were categorized as having made a false
identification. When the “not there” option was present, participants who chose the “not there”
option were qualified as having made a correct rejection. This category was also composed of
those who, when the “not there” option was absent, chose to make no decision, and simply
continued on to the next portion of the survey.
Identification decisions. Chi-square analyses were utilized to examine the impacts of
instructions (biased vs. unbiased) and the “not there” option (there vs. not there) on false
identification rates. Collapsing across instruction type, there was a significant effect of the “not
there” option on identification rates, χ2(1) = 78.79, p < .001: False identifications were more
likely to occur when there was no “not there” option (97.8%) than when there was a “not there”
option (50.7%). However, the effect of instructions on identification rates was only marginally
significant when collapsing across the presence of a “not there” option, χ2(1) = 2.77, p = .10: The
rate of false identifications was only marginally significantly greater when the instructions were
biased (78.7%) than when they were unbiased (69.9%). In short, the “not there” option made
more of a difference for false identification rates than unbiased instructions did.
Having a “not there” option also had significant impacts on identification choice when
splitting by instruction type. When biased instructions were given, participants who did not
receive the “not there” option were more likely to make a false identification (100%) than
participants for whom the “not there” option was present (57.4%), χ2(1) = 36.86, p < .001. The
“not there” option likewise influenced false identification rates when unbiased instructions were
given, χ2(1) = 42.77, p < .001. The pattern of the effect of the “not there” option remained
overall consistent between biased and unbiased instructions: participants were more likely to
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make a false identification when there was no “not there” option (95.6%) than when the “not
there” option was there (44.1%). These data are represented in Figure 3.

False Identifications
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Unbiased
"Not There" Option Absent

Figure 3. How instruction type and the presence of a “not there” option influence false
identification rates.
As can also be seen in Figure 3, when the “not there” option was present, biased
instructions produced a rate of false identifications (57.4%) that did not significantly differ from
the rate of false identifications made when unbiased instructions were given, (44.1%), χ2(1) =
2.383, p = .12. Similarly, there was no impact of instruction type on false identifications when
the “not there” option was absent, χ2(1) = 3.07, p = .244; 100% of people given biased
instructions made a false identification compared to 95.6% in the unbiased instructions
condition.
Certainty. A univariate ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the “not there”
option on certainty, F(1, 268) = 49.47, p = .01: participants given a “not there” option rated their
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certainty as significantly higher (M = 6.13, SD = 0.21) than participants not given a “not there”
option (M = 5.28, SD = 0.21). There was no significant main effect of warning on certainty, F(1,
268) = 0.06, p = .807. There was, however, a significant interaction between the presence of a
“not there” option and instruction type, F(1, 268) = 74.13, p < .001. When instructions were
biased, certainty did not depend on whether the “not there” option was there (M = 5.57, SD=
2.48) or not there (M = 5.76, SD= 2.54), t(134) = 0.44, p = .66. However, when instructions were
unbiased, participants given a “not there” option rated their certainty as higher (M = 6.69, SD =
2.45) than those who were not given a “not there” option (M = 4.79, SD = 2.42), t(134) = 4.50, p
< .001. These data are represented in Figure 4.
When unbiased instructions were given, those who made false identifications rated their
confidence as significantly higher when the “not there” option was present than when it was
absent, t(93) = 0.36, p < .001. Analyses on the differential effect of a “not there” option on
certainty for those who made a correct rejection in the unbiased instructions condition were
inconclusive, as only three participants without a “not there” option rejected the lineup. Means
and standard deviations for ratings of certainty when splitting by decision type are in Table 1.
The interaction can also be explored in terms of the differential impacts of instructions
based on the presence of a “not there” option. When the “not there” option was provided,
participants rated their confidence as significantly higher in the unbiased instructions condition
(M = 6.69, SD = 2.50) than in the biased instructions condition (M = 5.57, SD = 2.45), t(134) =
2.63, p = .01. This pattern was reversed when the “not there” option was absent: those given
unbiased instructions rated their certainty as significantly lower (M = 4.79, SD = 2.42) than those
who were given biased instructions (M = 5.76, SD = 2.54), t(134) = 2.28, p = .02. These inverse
patterns likely explain the failure to find a main effect of instruction type on certainty.
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Eyewitnesses who made false identifications when the “not there” option was present
were more confident if they were given unbiased instructions than if they were given biased
instructions, though this difference fell short of significance, t(61.70) = 1.56, p = .125. The
difference was marginally significant between those who made a correct rejection in the
unbiased instructions condition and those who made a correct rejection in the biased instructions
condition, t(65) = 1.91, p = .06. When the “not there” option was absent, those who were given
unbiased instructions were significantly less confident in their false identification than those who
made a false identification with biased instructions, t(131) = 2.89, p = .004. Analysis on the
differential impact of instruction type on certainty when the “not there” option was absent for
those who made correct rejections was not possible because no participants in the biased
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Figure 4. The influence of instruction type and the presence of a “not there” option on
ratings of certainty.
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______________________________________________________________________________
Biased

Unbiased

______________________________________________
“Not there” “Not there” “Not there” “Not there”
present
absent
present
absent
______________________________________________________________________________
Certainty
False ID

5.49 (2.28)

5.76 (2.54)

6.37 (2.34)

Correct Rejection

5.69 (2.75)

--

6.95 (2.62)

4.57 (2.21)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------View
False ID

5.77 (2.37)

5.84 (2.30)

Correct Rejection

5.52 (2.68)

--

5.93 (2.21)
6.00 (2.55)

5.11 (2.23)
--

______________________________________________________________________________
Table 1. Mean ratings of certainty and view split by decision type. Values in parentheses
are standard deviations.
View. There was also a marginally significant interaction between instruction type and
whether or not there was a “not there” option on how good participants rated their view as being,
F(1, 267) = 19.43, p = .06. When instructions were unbiased, participants in the “not there”
option present condition rated their view as being significantly better (M = 5.97, SD = 2.40) than
participants in the “not there” option absent condition (M = 5.07, SD= 2.24), t(134) = 2.26, p =
.03. However, when instructions were biased, there was no significant difference in assessment
of view quality between those who got a “not there” option (M = 5.66, SD = 2.49) and those who
did not (M = 5.84, SD= 2.30), t(133) = 0.42, p = .17.
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Those who made a false identification after being given unbiased instructions rated their
view as being marginally significantly better if they were given a “not there” option if the “not
there” option was not given, t(134) = 2.26, p = .03. The analysis of the differential influences of
the “not there” option on view for those who made correct rejections was inconclusive, as only
three participants rejected the lineup with unbiased instructions and no “not there” option.
Ratings of view did not differ significantly between when the “not there” option was present and
when it was absent for those who made a false identification with biased instructions, t(104) =
0.14, p = .89. As there were no correct rejections when instructions were biased and the “not
there” option was not presented, insufficient data on ratings of view in this condition prevented
analysis. Means and standard deviations for ratings of view when splitting by decision type are in
Table 1.
The interaction effect can also be interpreted in terms of the differential impacts of
instruction type depending on the presence of a “not there” option. Participants for whom there
was a “not there” option provided did not rate the view as being of different quality in the biased
instructions condition (M = 5.66, SD = 2.49) versus the unbiased instructions condition (M =
5.97, SD = 2.39), t(134) = 0.74, p = .46. However, when the “not there” option was absent, those
who heard biased instructions (M = 5.84, SD = 2.30) rated their view as being marginally
significantly better than those who heard unbiased instructions (M = 5.07, SD = 2.42), t(133) =
1.95, p = .05.
When the “not there” option was present and a false identification was made, people did
not rate their view significantly differently in the biased instructions condition compared to the
unbiased instructions condition, t(67) = 0.29, p = .77. The difference between ratings of view
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with biased instructions and unbiased instructions when the “not there” option was present was
likewise not significant for participants who made correct rejections, t(65) = 0.75, p = .46. 6
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Figure 5. The influence of instruction type and the presence of a “not there” option on
ratings of view.
Discussion
Identification decisions. In previous studies examining the effect of unbiased
instructions on identification decisions, unbiased instructions were often confounded with the
presence of a “not there” option (see Steblay, 1997). In parsing these variables apart, Study 2
determined that, collapsing across the presence of a “not there” option, there was only a
marginally significant effect of instruction type on false identification rates. Furthermore, when
splitting by the presence of a “not there” option, there was no effect of instructions on false
identification rates. In contrast, there was a highly significant effect of the presence of the “not

6

The pattern of means evident on view was consistent across participants’ ratings of how able
they were to make out specific features of the culprit’s face and how much they would trust an
identification made by someone who had a similar view of the culprit as them. The pattern of
means for participants’ ratings of difficulty was opposite with respects to the direction of the
trends, but consistent with respects to the meaning of the pattern.
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there” option when collapsing across instruction type, whereby those given a “not there” option
made significantly fewer false identifications than those not provided with that option. This
effect was also present when splitting by instruction type: the “not there” option decreased false
identification rates both when unbiased instructions were given and when biased instructions
were given. The lack of a highly significant effect of instruction type in conjunction with a
significant reduction in false identifications between the “not there” option absent and the “not
there” option present conditions suggests the difference found in previous studies might not be as
attributable to unbiased instructions as previously thought, but rather might be a result of having
a “not there” option. Exact replications of this study would be useful in order to confirm the
reproducibility of these findings.
An additional way this experiment differs from those in the previous literature is that the
instructions were delivered via computer through a video, rather than in person. While this is
consistent with recommendations to standardize eyewitness procedures, it potentially makes the
lineup administrator seem more distant to participants. According to Milgram (1965), proximity
of the authority has significant bearings on obedience, where the farther the authority is, the less
likely they are to be obeyed. This could mean participants in this study were more likely to
discount the instructions than if they were to be given in person, where the authority figure
would be more proximal. This possibly could account for why there was no, or very minimal,
effects of instructions on false identification rates. However, the viability of the explanation that
the video instructions account for the pattern of data is called into question by the effects of the
instructions that occur for testimony relevant judgments. Despite not impacting false
identifications, instruction type influenced other variables, suggesting that the fact instructions
were provided using a recorded video may not be responsible for the lack of an effect of
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instructions. Future studies using the same manipulation as Study 2 but with the instructions
delivered in person are necessary to entirely rule out this potential explanation.
Another factor, besides the independent variables, that might bear on these results is that
the sample consisted of MTurk workers, who regularly complete a variety of surveys. Perhaps a
lack of an effect of instructions was a result of survey takers not taking the care or putting in the
energy necessary for the manipulations to be successful. However, if this were true, it is likely
that no effects would have been found. However, data demonstrated significant effects of the
“not there” option, as well as of instruction type on various post-identification questionnaire
measures.
Certainty. In addition to influencing identification decisions, instruction type and the
presence of a “not there” option had significant bearing on mock-eyewitnesses’ evaluations of
how certain they were about their identification decision. The most interesting and relevant
results to the applied field of eyewitness identification research is the pattern of certainty ratings
when false identifications were made, as these are the scenarios in which a case is most likely to
go to trial. Given that confident eyewitnesses may be viewed as more credible by jurors, these
are particularly problematic cases. In the present data, certainty in a false identification resulting
from a lineup scenario where unbiased instructions were given was significantly lower when
eyewitnesses were not given a “not there” option than when the “not there” option was present.
In fact, this condition produced the lowest certainty ratings, which, by itself, might suggest that it
is valuable to give eyewitnesses unbiased instructions without a “not there” option in order to
keep confidence in false identifications low. However, this suggestion ignores the identification
decision data, as this cell also produced an extremely high rate of false identifications (95.6%).
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Although there is no significant difference in certainty between instruction type when the
“not there” option is present, the trend demonstrates a lower certainty in false identifications for
biased versus unbiased instructions. This pattern reflects the findings in Steblay’s (1997) metaanalysis, though that difference was significant where this one fails to be. These data suggest that
the use of unbiased instructions has both positive and negative consequences: while they create
non significantly lower rates of false identifications, they also produce a higher certainty in false
identifications. As noted, this increase in confidence is problematic because jurors perceive an
eyewitness and their identification as more credible when their verbal (or stated) confidence is
higher (Whitley & Greenberg, 1986).
The pattern of confidence for mock-eyewitnesses who made false identifications is
consistent with the conclusion that decision criteria are set higher for those in the “not there”
option present condition, whether unbiased or biased instructions are given. That is, when
participants were given unbiased instructions in tandem with the “not there” option, they
required more of a match between the suspect and their memory for the culprit to be willing to
make an identification. However, certainty ratings for those who made correct rejections follow
this same pattern, suggesting that the greater certainty in false identifications made in the “not
there” option present, unbiased instruction condition might not be attributable to an increase in
decision criteria, but rather to overall increases in confidence for participants in this condition,
regardless of the decision. And it is unclear whether or not a higher decision criterion is also
responsible for higher confidence when correct rejections are made.
General Discussion
The present studies examined the impact of instructions and question format on
identification rates, as well as on confidence and other testimony relevant judgments. Study 1
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aimed to determine whether or not warning participants about the consequences of a
misidentification would increase the diagnosticity of an identification. Study 2 examined the
differential impacts of instruction type (unbiased vs. biased) and the presence of a “not there”
option on false identification rates by treating these as different independent variables. Social
psychology research determining ways to reduce false identification rates is essential to promote
data-driven recommendations to the justice system that would help preserve the freedom of
innocent people.
Results from both studies indicate that while certain variables influence identification
rates, others fail to. For example, in Study 1 data suggests that consequence information had no
bearing on both false identification and correct identification rates, as well as no impact on
correct rejections. Study 1, however, does not exhaust all of the possible warnings that might
have an effect of identification decision making. For example, one could conceive that
information about the likelihood of an identification would constitute a system variable that
might decrease false identifications. The consequence warning in Study 1 only implied that one
might be inaccurate. Explicitly manipulating the likelihood of error might have more impact on
decision criteria.
Study 2 found variables that had a significant influence not only on false identification
rates, but on certainty, ratings of view, ratings of ability to make out specific features of the
culprit’s face, how difficult participants found making an identification, and other testimony
relevant judgments. The most striking finding from the present research is that while it was
previously thought that unbiased instructions was a system variable that significantly influenced
false identification rates, Study 2 data indicated that unbiased instructions had relatively little
impact compared to having a “not there” option, which significantly reduced false identifications
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both collapsing across instruction condition and when the data were split by instruction type.
Another notable finding from Study 2 is the effect instruction type and the presence of a “not
there” option had on ratings of certainty in false identifications: confidence in a false
identification was highest when unbiased instructions and a “not there” option were given.
Though the difference was not significant, certainty was lower when biased instructions were
used and a “not there” option was provided than when unbiased instructions were used along
with a “not there” option. Certainty was lowest when unbiased instructions were given without a
“not there” option: this pattern makes sense in that, if those given unbiased instructions have
higher decision criteria but no explicit option to reject the lineup, they will make an identification
even if they don’t feel entirely comfortable with that decision. Further research is necessary to
establish the differences between the separate impacts of instruction type and the presence of a
“not there” option.
If the pattern of data found in Study 2 is replicated in future studies, such data would
suggest that making recommendations for lineup administrators to use unbiased instructions
might be ineffective in reducing false identifications. Rather, lineup administrators should be
advised to use, and perhaps standardize, identification materials which provide an explicit “not
there” option at the time of identification.
Conclusion
With continued investment in research on eyewitness identifications, false identifications,
and confidence, social psychology at the intersection of law has the potential to prevent many
innocent people who become implicated in crimes from being wrongfully convicted as a result of
false eyewitness identifications. Although the years that Willie Jackson spent in prison can never
be given back to him, continued success in identifying system variables that reduce false
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identifications, and subsequent changes within the legal system, will help prevent other innocent
people from being wrongfully incarcerated and unjustly stripped of their deserved freedom.
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Culprit Absent Lineup

Culprit Present Lineup
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Appendix D: Screenshot of Lineup Administrator Delivering Instructions
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Appendix E: Videotape Instructions Scripts
General Instructions
“You are about to watch a short video. There is an individual in the video and I want you
to pay close attention to him because you will be answering questions about him later.”
Unbiased Instructions
“The man in the video has been accused of placing a bomb in the ventilation system of
that building. The purpose of this experiment is for you, as the eyewitness, to identify the man
who you saw in the video. A photographic lineup will appear on the screen. The perpetrator who
placed the bomb in the ventilation system may be one of the members of the lineup. There is also
the potential that the perpetrator is not in the lineup. Below the lineup, please indicate which
person was the one in the video.”
Biased Instructions
“The man in the video has been accused of placing a bomb in the ventilation system of
that building. The purpose of this experiment is for you, as the eyewitness, to identify the man
who you saw in the video. A photographic lineup will appear on the screen. Below the lineup,
please indicate which person was the one in the video.”
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